Diplomats, experts, and civil society representatives are gathering in New York for the 2026 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference amid intensifying geopolitical tensions, growing scepticism about the effectiveness of multilateral diplomacy, and mounting concern over the future of the global arms control architecture. Against the backdrop of ongoing wars, sharpened great power competition, nuclear modernisation, procedural deadlock, and renewed disputes over the credibility and fairness of the non-proliferation regime, the conference has exposed deep disagreements not only about nuclear policy, but also about the purpose and viability of the NPT process itself.
We asked ELN staff who attended the RevCon to reflect on what this year’s conference reveals about the strengths, weaknesses, and future prospects of the NPT regime; the political and procedural challenges shaping negotiations; the pressures facing multilateral diplomacy; and what will be required to preserve, strengthen, and adapt the regime in an increasingly unstable international environment.
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“The NPT is ultimately what States Parties make of it. So far, this Review Conference suggests that more and more states are no longer willing to invest political capital in sustaining or strengthening the Treaty.”
Oliver Meier
Head of Programme, Nuclear and Multilateral Disarmament
High profile clashes over Iran’s nuclear programme, heated arguments between the three largest nuclear weapons states – China, Russia and the United States – and ritualistic exchanges between critics and supporters of NATO nuclear sharing arrangements dominated the opening week of the NPT Review Conference.
But behind the attention-grabbing diplomatic disputes, two structural problems which have been slowly but consistently eroding the nuclear non-proliferation regime were on display in New York.
First, key players are less willing to work through the NPT to preserve the nuclear order. Moscow and Washington believe that militarily powerful states should have their own spheres of influence, where might makes right. This narrow and egocentric worldview is incompatible with the NPT’s approach to preserving international order, which rests on respect for the rule of law and a willingness to compromise across the NPT’s three pillars: disarmament, non-proliferation, and cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear technologies.
Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine – supported by nuclear threats from the Kremlin – has further undermined a key tenet of the NPT, namely that the five nuclear-weapon states should not exploit their privileged status for own security gains (they have always abused their status, but never so blatantly).
These countries are not interested in solving problems, including non-compliance concerns, through the NPT. Russia criticizes France’s proposed “forward deterrence” posture but fails to offer talks on non-strategic nuclear weapons. The Trump administration, meanwhile, accuses China of having violated the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) but does not engage with proposals to clarify non-compliance concerns.
It is perhaps not surprising, then, that even staunch supporters of multilateralism increasingly approach the treaty with a “what’s-in-it-for-us” attitude. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s complaint at the Munich Security Conference that Berlin’s foreign policy has had “something of a normative surplus” is indicative of the shift toward power politics even among those who previously were staunch supporters of multilateralism.
Second, Washington’s misuse of the NPT, and many other multilateral fora besides, for promotion of the Trump administration’s nationalist agenda leaves a vacuum that other states or groups of states have so far been unable or unwilling to fill.
The European Union would be best placed to fill that void. Ahead of the Review Conference, its 27 member states agreed on a joint position that, on many issues, reflects a pragmatic middle ground: reaffirming support for all three NPT pillars, calling for further arms control and risk reduction measures, backing stronger transparency and accountability mechanisms, and stressing the importance of multilateral diplomacy.
But internal divisions and fears of antagonizing the Trump administration have prevented Europeans, at least so far, from actively leading NPT parties toward a meaningful outcome.
The one thing that NPT participants can agree on is that conference President Đỗ Hùng Việt is doing an admirable job in trying to bridge political gaps. He is enforcing speaking rules without fear or favour. By delivering the first draft of an outcome document in the middle of week two, Việt has given delegations more time to strike compromises. Yet a President has only limited capacity and no real leverage to actively steer debates toward a sensible middle ground.
The NPT is ultimately what States Parties make of it. So far, this Review Conference suggests that more and more states are no longer willing to invest the necessary political capital to sustain or strengthen the Treaty. If this trend continues, the NPT’s slow drift into irrelevance is likely to accelerate.
NPT stakeholders can only halt or reverse this trend through a concerted collective effort. That means calling out spoilers, asking what we can do for the NPT – rather than focusing solely on what the NPT can do for us – and having the courage to pursue uncomfortable and potentially costly compromises needed keep this vital regime alive.
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“Avoiding collapse should not be confused with progress. For a treaty like the NPT, ‘not failing’ is too low a bar.”
Jana Baldus
Policy Fellow, Nuclear and Multilateral Disarmament
The atmosphere at this year’s NPT RevCon swings between cautious hope and deep pessimism, amid concerns about the NPT’s effectiveness under intensifying great power competition and waning US support for multilateralism. After the first half of the conference, one question has become increasingly pertinent: can the regime remain credible if major powers continue to use procedure, rhetoric, and political manoeuvring to pursue their own narrow interests?
The US effectively set the tone by politicising procedure before the conference even began. By raising procedural votes on Iran-related issues, the US delegation signalled its readiness for maximum disruption and dashed hopes for a constructive atmosphere. When the immediate breakdown of the RevCon was avoided, relief that “at least it didn’t blow up right at the beginning” quickly shaped expectations. Procedural survival – the ability to keep the RevCon going – was treated as success.
However, avoiding collapse should not be confused with progress. For a treaty like the NPT, “not failing” is too low a bar.
After the near-disastrous beginning, the general sense of relief has overshadowed several troubling trends: sharp and aggressive rhetoric, procedural obstruction, cycles of accusation and counter-accusation – with all NPT nuclear-weapons states fiercely accusing each other of undermining the NPT and/or international security – and little expression of shared responsibility for the health of multilateral diplomacy and the NPT itself.
If states parties are serious about the significance of the NPT, they need to actively defend the treaty against disruptors. This includes reducing the space for any spoilers to block or slow progress. The RevCon should not hinge on the approval of any single actor. In the final week of negotiations, States Parties will need to push for progress even when the US, Russia, China, Iran or any other state tries to block it. This requires not only coordination and sustained pressure, but also political will from non-nuclear-weapon states and those nuclear-weapon states that remain committed to upholding the NPT. European states will need to be more consistent and courageous in resisting disruptive tactics, including – and especially – when they come from partners.
There are still reasons for optimism. Many non-nuclear-weapon states have stepped up efforts to counteract the weakening of existing commitments and reduce the risk of nuclear conflict. States voiced widespread concerns about threats to resume nuclear testing, emphasising the importance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to the NPT. And despite political pressure from the US and others, the first draft outcome document reaffirmed past NPT commitments.
Collective engagement and normative pressure remain essential. Without them, the NPT risks further stagnation and growing dysfunction.
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“There is a shared sense that the NPT remains important, but far less agreement on what success looks like or how close the regime is to the edge.”
Sophie Taylor
Head of Strategic Engagement
The opening week of the 2026 NPT Review Conference, in many ways, reflects the broader state of the non-proliferation regime. There is a shared sense that the NPT remains important, but far less agreement on what success looks like or how close the regime is to the edge. Diplomats, government officials, and civil society representatives find themselves stretched between reality and expectation. The release of the zero draft outcome document last week will bring these tensions to the fore as work shifts from prepared statements to detailed language and diplomatic trade-offs.
Broadly speaking, I sensed three approaches to this RevCon. Much now depends on whether states can, or will, make progress in any of these areas. They were:
A classic review conference: focused on performance and progress against commitments and obligations under the NPT and its three pillars. There is a split within this group between those focused on this review cycle (2022-2026) and those taking a longer-term perspective based on the 2010 Action Plan.
Procedurally focused: Given the failure of States Parties at the past two RevCons to reach consensus on an outcome document (in real terms, a period of 16 years), many are focused on moving beyond the current deadlock. There was, at least in the first week, a genuine sense of goodwill, or shared interest, in avoiding an outright breakdown of the process. The weekend before the RevCon saw last-minute diplomatic work to avoid an unprecedented vote on Iran’s election as Vice President of the General Committee, which would have stalled work before it even began.
A political forum: an opportunity to challenge nuclear-weapon states and for all sides to raise wider geopolitical concerns, including Russia’s war against Ukraine, Iran’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, China’s modernisation of its nuclear arsenal, US airstrikes, Franco-British cooperation, broader geopolitical competition, and more. For some, these issues are inseparable from questions about the legitimacy of nuclear weapons and the credibility of the NPT.
These approaches are, of course, interwoven, but they felt distinct enough to separate analytically. It will be important for states to make demonstrable progress in at least one of these areas to create the political space and goodwill needed to address the others. That means unblocking the process in order to review compliance, or finding ways to incorporate geopolitical developments into broader procedural discussions. However, we cannot forget what the NPT is for. Meaningful progress towards disarmament and a world free of nuclear weapons, even if only in small steps, must be made. Without this, there is not only a risk of another failed outcome at this RevCon, but also of diminishing confidence in the NPT’s grand bargain and the treaty’s overall utility – an outcome I do not think even so-called spoilers would want.
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“If the NPT and the broader arms control architecture are to remain viable in the coming decades, the next generation cannot simply inherit existing frameworks passively. We need to be prepared to strengthen them, rethink them where necessary, and actively shape where these discussions go next.”
Nikita Gryazin
Policy Fellow
One of my main takeaways from attending the 2026 NPT Review Conference was the extent to which confidence in diplomacy itself appears to be eroding. Beyond the formal statements and procedural debates, many conversations throughout the conference reflected a deeper sense of frustration about the limitations of existing diplomatic processes, the growing difficulty of sustaining meaningful strategic dialogue, and the absence of clear political leadership at a time of profound geopolitical instability.
For me, one of the most valuable aspects of the week was organising a series of meetings and exchanges through the Younger Generation Leaders Network (YGLN). Alongside internal YGLN discussions focused on Euro-Atlantic security issues from various angles, we had the opportunity to engage directly and candidly with diplomats, international officials, and practitioners involved in the NPT process. What stood out in these conversations was the honesty with which officials discussed the current state of the non-proliferation regime, the limitations of existing diplomatic processes, and the growing difficulty of sustaining meaningful strategic dialogue.
These exchanges were particularly important because they offered younger experts a more realistic understanding of how diplomacy actually functions under conditions of crisis and geopolitical fragmentation. For many of us working in this field, hearing directly from practitioners about the pressures, frustrations, and constraints affecting today’s diplomatic processes was both sobering and motivating.
At the same time, these conversations reinforced something that increasingly feels central to the future of the NPT and arms control more broadly: the importance of leadership. Across diplomacy today, there is often no shortage of rhetoric, procedural repetition, or even arrogance, but there is a growing absence of political courage, strategic vision, and confidence in the ability to shape outcomes positively. In this field, we continue to reference the leadership of figures such as US Presidents Kennedy, Carter, and Obama, yet one increasingly important question remains: where are the leaders of the present?
This is precisely why next-generation engagement matters. Networks like YGLN are spaces where future leaders can build expertise, confidence, and relationships across national and institutional divides. If the NPT and the broader arms control architecture are to remain viable in the coming decades, the next generation cannot simply inherit existing frameworks passively. We need to be prepared to strengthen them, rethink them where necessary, and actively shape where these discussions go next.
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The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.
